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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTICLE 6-JOINDER OF CLAIMS, CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE
CPLR 602: Court reestablishes prerequisites to consolidation.
Much has been said about the broad discretion of the courts to
order the consolidation of actions involving a common question of law
or fact.46 Indeed, consolidation is not prevented by the fact that one
action is at law and the other in equity;47 or by the fact that the
parties in the two actions are not identical; 48 or by the fact that all
of the issues raised are not common. 49 Consolidation "is not only a
saving in time, trouble, and expense to the parties and the state, but
a preventive of the injustice which may result from divergent decisions
in each separate case." 50
Despite the ostensible ease with which actions may be joined,
counsel should not be lulled into a false sense of security. As recently
ruled by the Second Department in Rubin v. Grossmanr1 consolida-
tion is not automatic; certain prerequisites must be met. In Rubin an
order granting a motion to consolidate a personal injury action and a
wrongful death action was reversed on the ground that plaintiff failed
to produce "medical proof showing the causal relationship between the
accident and the subsequent death .... -52
At first glance, the actions in Rubin would seem to invoke similar
questions of law and fact, particularly defendant's liability for the in-
ifiction of the initial injury. Nonetheless, courts have stated in the
past,53 and now again in Rubin, that some medical proof is required
to show the causal connection between the injury and the death; con-
jecture on the part of the movant is insufficient. Obviously, the medical
affidavits need not be so extensive as to prove the causation, but they
must, at least, connect the death to the injury.
ARTICLE 21 - PAPERS
CPLR 2103(a): Licensing statute upheld by lower court.
In an apparent attempt to control the "systematic and widespread
abuses so prevalent in the field of process serving," the New York
46 CPLR 602.
47 See Philip Shlansky & Brother, Inc. v. Grossman, 273 App. Div. 544, 78 N.YS.2d 127
(1st Dep't 1948).
48 See Edelstein v. Hacker, 152 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1956).
49 See Moore v. Parks, 29 App. Div. 2d 912, 289 N.Y.S.2d 877 (4th Dep't 1968).
50 Philip Shlansky & Brother, Inc. v. Grossman, 273 App. Div. 544, 566, 78 N.Y.S.2d
127, 128 (1st Dep't 1948).
5134 App. Div. 2d 680, 310 N.Y.S.2d 395 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem).
52 1d., 310 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
53 See Augenbraun v. G&B Distrib., 17 App. Div. 2d 785, 232 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't
1962); cf. McCarthy v. Downes, 17 App. Div. 2d 919, 233 N.YS.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1962).
54 ABC Process Serving Bureau Inc. v. City of New York, 63 Misc. 2d 33, 34, 310 N.YS.
2d 859, 861 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1969, at 60, col. 1.
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City Council enacted Article 43, Chapter 32 of the Administrative
Code of the City of New York, 5 providing in pertinent part that "it
shall be unlawful for any person to be employed as or perform the
services of a process server without a license therefor."5 This provision
was challenged in ABC Process Serving Bureau Inc. v. City of New
York 57 on two grounds: first, that it was applicable only to individual
process servers, and, second, that the new law was in conflict with CPLR
2103(a).58
Neither argument prevailed. From the definition of "process
server" in the statute, 9 the court found an intention on the part of the
City Council to include those in the business of serving process as
well as the actual servers. Regarding a possible conflict with the CPLR,
the court held that the local law was complementary to the statewide
procedure. Furthermore, there was no evidence of legislative preemp-
tion as a bar to its enactment.
ABC Process represents the first sign of dissatisfaction with the
new provision. However, a more relevant question for the future will
not be to whom does the provision apply but to what types of papers
does it apply. While the need for some kind of control over process
servers is obvious, the new proviso may result in the opening of a
pandora's box of inconveniences if it is construed in its broadest sense
to include the service of all process. More sensibly, the law should be
applied only in the case of service of initiatory process and not to other
less important papers whch are often served by the attorney's clerk
or secretary.
ARTICLE 23- SUBPOENAS, OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS
CPLR 2303: Propriety of substituted service of subpoena confirmed.
Under the CPA, a subpoena issued to compel the attendance ol
a witness was required to be "delivered to the witness." 60 Although this
requirement for personal delivery was not construed so strictly as to
55 1969 Local Laws of the City of New York, No. 80 (effective April 1, 1970).
56 Id. § B32-450.0.
5763 Misc. 2d 33, 310 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
58 CPLR 2103(a) provides that "[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by law or order
of court, papers may be served by any person not a party of the age of eighteen years or
over."
59 1969 Local Laws of the City of New York, No. 80, § B32-451.0, provides:
A process server is a person engaged in the business of serving or one who pur-
ports to serve or one who serves personally or by substituted service upon any
person, corporation, governmental or political subdivision or agency, a summons,
subpoena, notice, citation or other process, directing an appearance or response
to a legal action, legal proceeding or administrative proceedings.
6D CPA 406.
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